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1 Introduction
An important issue in the literature on delegation and control in hierarchies
is how power has to be shared between the top layer (principal, she) and
subordinates (agents, he). We argue that, contrary to common wisdom, the
principal may prefer not to delegate power to a subordinate when the subor-
dinate’s interests are too similar to the principal’s ones. We then investigate
the optimal dynamic pattern of delegation, showing that it is characterized
by an increase in the amount of power held by a subordinate over time.
Following Aghion and Tirole (1997), we define formal authority the legal
ability to make decisions in unforeseen circumstances or to control an asset,
where the term legal implies that the attribution of authority is ratified by
a contract. Conversely, real authority is the ability to exert actual control
of the asset, authority conferred by the knowledge of important information.
In general, formal does not imply necessarily real authority, especially in the
presence of incomplete and asymmetric information. Often in organizations
the individuals who hold formal authority are not the ones who take relevant
decisions.
In this paper we analyze a situation where the principal and one agent
perform several tasks, that differ in the degree of congruence of the parties’
interests. For some tasks interests are very close and both parties would
choose the same actions when free to decide. For other tasks, it is very
unlikely that the most preferred options for one party coincide with the
second party’s ones. We investigate which activities the principal decides to
delegate, given the divergence in interests. We also study how many out of
these activities the principal delegates and what are the principles informing
the extent of delegation.
As Aghion and Tirole (1997) show, delegating formal authority to an
agent is both an incentive device to increase his initiative and a means to
ensure his participation. After delegation, the principal no longer has the
opportunity to overrule the agent and the agent’s expected return from effort
increases.1 That is why the agent’s reservation utility is more easily achieved.
Delegation, however, eliminates also the obstacles that prevent the agent from
pursuing his own aims. The principal should then delegate formal authority
only when the interests of both parties are close enough.
We show that, for given values of the parameters, the delegated activities
may not be the ones characterized by the highest degree of coincidence of
interests but rather those with “intermediate” congruence. To understand
1This result is termed basic-trade off between control and initiative by Aghion and
Tirole (1997).
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such result, it should be noticed that, when congruence of interests is high, it
is very likely that the agent achieves the principal’s goals, even if motivated
by self interest. This implies that the principal does not need to monitor him
very closely, which enhances the agent’s initiative, inducing high effort even
if authority is not delegated. When parties’ interests are very close, however,
subordinates may have the incentive to shirk, free riding on the superior’s
knowledge and effort, even when they hold formal authority.2
We then investigate how the control structure of an organization is mod-
ified over time according to changes in the agent’s ability. It is assumed that
the agent’s ability increases over time in a way that is proportional both
to past effort exerted on a particular activity and to the number of times
she has been performing that activity. We show that the agent is ready to
spend high effort in earlier periods, when the cost reducing impact of effort
lasts for a long time and the returns from a certain amount of effort are then
large. The agent thus requires weaker incentives and works hard even if the
principal delegates her a small number of activities. As time elapses and the
agent’s productive life approaches the end, the future benefits from effort are
reduced and the principal needs to strengthen incentives, delegating more.
We then reach the result, typical in the literature on dynamic incentives,
that the intensity of incentives has to increase over time.
The nature of our result, however, differs from the traditional literature
on incentives. In our case, it is neither because of career concerns nor because
of implicit incentives that agents tend to put higher effort in the earlier stages
of her contract.3 It is rather because his (specific) investment in effort is more
remunerating that the agent is prone to work harder at the beginning of his
career.
This paper is related to the literature on organizations and to the theory
of contracts. Typically, the literature has stressed the incomplete nature
of the contracts regulating the relationship between the owners (or, more
generally, the top of the hierarchy of an organization) and subordinates. A
contract has to specify clearly who has the power to decide in all contingent
events not included in the contract.
Two main directions have been followed. On the one hand, it has been
analyzed how a contract should allocate control rights over productive assets
to a subordinate, especially when these assets (which can be both physical
assets or human capital) are the result of specific investments, subject to
the threat of hold-up problems (see Grossman and Hart, 1986 and Hart and
2This problem of free-riding is quite relevant and is usually overlooked in the typical
literature on delegation and totally absent in Aghion and Tirole’s (1997) analysis.
3For problems of dynamic incentives and for career concerns see Gibbons and Murphy
(1982), MacLeod and Malcomson (1988) and Meyer and Vickers (1997).
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Moore, 1990). On the other hand, it has been studied how an owner (or,
more generally, a superior) should provide incentives to work hard and make
the “right” decisions to a subordinate, when the latter has control powers
(this is the typical literature on agency and delegation, see, for instance,
Grossman and Hart, 1983 or Holmstro¨m and Milgrom, 1987). The approach
a´ la´ Grossman, Hart and Moore deals with the allocation of formal authority
in the presence of specific investments. The principal-agent approach takes
as given the delegation of authority to subordinates and deals instead with
incentive problems and informational asymmetry.
Aghion and Tirole (1997) present a synthesis between the literature on
agency and on dynamic (implicit) incentives and the incomplete-contracts
approach a´ la´ Grossman and Hart (1986). They consider explicitly the role
of information and the existence of real authority, in addition to formal.
In their paper, Aghion and Tirole do not deal with intertemporal issues
nor examine formally the relationship between delegation and congruence of
interests. In this paper we want to provide an answer to both questions.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 the basic setting with
multitasking is introduced. Section 3 investigates how the congruence of in-
terests between the principal and the agent influences the allocation of formal
authority. Section 4 characterises the optimal pattern of delegation, taking
into account also the agent’s incentive to free ride on the principal’s effort.
Empirical implications of our results are presented in Section 5. Section 6
extends the analysis to a generic T-period time horizon and introduces learn-
ing by doing for the agent. Section 7 presents conclusions and interpretation
of the results and, again, some empirical evidence about the intertemporal
case. Appendix A contains the proofs. Appendix B shows that the results
obtained here with linear cost functions can be generalized to different func-
tional forms.
2 The Basic Setting
Structure of the organization
Consider a simple two-tier relationship consisting of a principal and an agent.
The principal (she) hires the agent (he) to work on several economic activities
and ensures his participation to the contract by paying him a wage in line with
that currently available in the market. The performed activities generate an
income that accrues to both parties, as it will be clarified below.
Before these activities are undertaken, the principal allocates control
power (formal authority) upon them. For each activity she decides whether
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to retain formal authority or to delegate it to the agent. When the principal
keeps formal authority, she is in charge of the decision process relative to
that activity and has the right to impose her choices to the agent. If the
principal delegates formal authority, the agent is able to pick his most pre-
ferred options without being overruled, even if these options are opposite to
the principal’s objectives.
Production
The organization undertakes a continuum of activities.4 Each activity con-
sists of selecting one project out of a set of possible projects whose payoffs
are unknown ex ante to both parties. A set J of projects is associated to
activity j. Activity j consists of selecting and implementing a project from
its associated set J .
There are many examples of organizations whose productive activity
could be described in this way. It could be the case of the Research &
Development division of a firm, or picture the situation of a manager who
has to choose a new product and its marketing strategy.
Projects
A project set J contains nj projects, with nj ≥ 3. Among all projects be-
longing to a given set J only two are relevant. This means that they give
non-negative payoffs either to the principal or to the agent or to both.5 All
other projects in J always yield a very negative payoff to both.
Of the two relevant projects, one gives the principal a positive benefit
equal to pi > 0, one gives the agent a positive benefit b > 0. If the two positive
benefits are provided by the same project we say that there is congruence of
interests. The two positive benefits can be associated to different projects.
In this second scenario, one out of the two relevant projects yields pi > 0 to
the principal and 0 to the agent, whereas the other project yields b > 0 to
4This assumption is introduced for technical reasons and represents a convenient way
of modeling a framework where a very large number of tasks have to be performed.
5To understand why the agent may earn a private benefit from the productive activity
and why, in some cases, the principal earns no benefits when the agent does think about
the following examples. The agent may be interested in performing an R&D project that
is of great interest for him but not for the firm (for instance, the firm stipulates a contract
with an academic researcher who is interested in theoretical aspects, less relevant for the
firm). Buying a certain machine may be bad for the firm but may benefit the agent (he
may receive a bribe from the seller of the machine or establish a fruitful contact with a
prospective future employer).
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the agent and 0 to the principal.6
All activities then yield potentially the same payoffs to the parties but
differ in the degree of the parties’ interests. With probability αj, in fact, the
same project yields the positive benefit both to the principal and the agent
and their interests are congruent. The probability αj represents a measure of
interest congruence (or congruence parameter). With complementary prob-
ability 1 − αj different projects give pij to the principal and b to the agent.
Interests are therefore divergent and the two parties, when in charge of the
decision process, would like to choose different projects. The payoffs from
the two relevant projects (labeled 1 and 2) are described in the following
table
project 1 project 2 probability
pi, b 0, 0 αj
0, 0 pi, b αj
pi, 0 0, b 1− αj
0, b pi, 0 1− αj
Finally, because of the existence of very bad projects, a project will never
be selected unless at least one of the parties knows for sure that the payoff
is non-negative.
Activities are ordered by the principal in accordance to the congruence
parameter αj and can be represented on a segment of measure 1. Each activity
is identified by its congruence parameter αj.7 Together with the parameter
αj, when deciding whether to delegate activity j, the principal takes into
account the benefit she could potentially earn, pi and the agent’s benefit b
(this last piece of information reveals how keen is the agent on the activity).
As already mentioned, the nature of the projects and their payoffs are
unknown ex ante. A thorough process of screening is required in order to
avoid these very bad projects and identify the relevant ones. Both the princi-
pal and the agent screen each set of projects. Exerting effort ei, i ∈ {P,A} ,
ei ∈ {ei, ei} , with 0 ≤ ei < ei ≤ 1, party i can learn the projects’ true nature
with probability ei,whereas they remain uninformed with probability 1− ei.
Thus, the more effort exerted, the higher the probability of finding out which
is their preferred project.
6To abstract from problems of income distribution and rent extraction, pi and b repre-
sent the monetary measure of benefits which are private in nature and cannot be expro-
priated.
7The choice of the congruence parameter as an ordering criterion is justified by the
assumption that the principal considers the degree of congruence between her own and
the agent’s objectives as an indicator of the agent’s reliability.
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Timing
The game consists of four stages and the timing is as follows. At stage
one the principal decides the structure of control rights, allocating formal
authority over certain activities to the agent. At stage two both parties
collect information about all activities. At stage three, for each activity,
the party with formal authority, if informed, chooses a project. If the party
with formal authority is not informed, the other can exert real authority
and suggest her most preferred project.8 The principal never overturns the
agent’s choice because she knows for sure that her payoff will be non-negative,
i.e. the agent will never select a project yielding a very negative payoff. At
stage four the selected projects are implemented and payoffs are realized.
The timing of the model is summarized in Figure 1.
Preferences and utility functions
The principal is risk neutral. To abstract from problems of monetary incen-
tives it is assumed that the agent is infinitely averse to income risk.9 The
analysis focuses on the effects of the allocation of control on the agent’s be-
havior and not on the design of optimal incentive schemes. This implies
that he is not responsive to monetary incentives and receives a fixed pay-
ment equal to his reservation wage w¯, which is normalized to zero to save on
notation.
The principal and the agent maximize their expected payoffs from each
activity j with respect to ePj and eAj, the effort they exert in that particular
activity, i = P,A. Party i learns the projects’ payoffs with probability ei,
and is uninformed with probability 1− ei.
The principal’s effort can take any value in the interval [0, 1] . Her cost
function is quadratic in effort and equal to gP (eP ) = k
e2P
2 . The agent’s effort
can take only two values and it can be “high” or “low”, eA ∈ {eA, e¯A} . The
agent’s cost function is linear and equal to gA(eA) = γeA. The difference
in the costs of screening, the principal’s increasing faster, can be justified
noticing that the principal might be in charge of more tasks than the agent.
The latter performs only screening and project-selection functions, whereas
8In this model there is always a flow of information in both directions, from the principal
to the agent and vice-versa. The agent makes suggestions to the principal when she is not
informed about an activity she controls. Conversely, the principal communicates what she
learned about the tasks on which the agent has been delegated formal authority.
9In making this assumption we follow Aghion and Tirole (1997). Technically, reasoning
in terms of the linear incentive model by Holmstro¨m and Milgrom (1987), this implies that
the term β in the linear wage schedule w = a+ βx (where w is the wage paid and x is the
agent’s verifiable performance) is zero, so that the wage is fixed and equal to a.
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the principal has also to supervise and coordinate activities performed in
other divisions and might experience work overload.10
Before introducing the model, it is important to clarify the specific con-
cept of monitoring adopted here. It is monitoring ex ante: parties acquire
information before action is taken and not after, to assess the results ob-
tained.11 If the party with formal authority monitors and discovers the ac-
tions that suit her goals best, she overlooks any suggestion that might come
from the second party, whose initiative and effort would then be reduced.
That is why it is possible to identify a trade off between monitoring and ini-
tiative, trade off that does not exist if the traditional concept of monitoring
is adopted.
Principal’s formal authority
When the principal keeps formal authority over an activity, she overrules
the agent -without taking her report into consideration- whenever she was
able to find information herself.12 Only in cases where the principal has no
information will the agent have real authority.
The principal’s expected utility from an activity upon which she has for-
mal authority is
UP (eP , eA, pi, a) = ePpi + (1− eP )eAαpi − ke
2
P
2
(1)
that is, with probability eP the principal is informed and therefore is able to
choose and implement her preferred project, obtaining her private benefit pi.
The probability eP measures the extent to which the principal is able to exert
both formal and real authority. Being informed gives her the real power to
impose her formal authority. With probability (1 − eP )eAα the principal is
not informed whereas the agent obtained the information and chooses the
same project.
The agent’s expected payoff when the principal has formal authority is
UA(eA, eP , b, α) = ePαb+ (1− eP )eAb− γeA (2)
10For instance, the agent can be a division or an area manager, and the principal a
superior, in charge of more than one division/area.
11Typically, the literature considers monitoring ex post or auditing. See, for instance,
Baron and Besanko (1987).
12In this model information can be either hard (costlessly verifiable as soon as it is
communicated to the principal) or soft (not verifiable), since this wouldn’t modify the
results.
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when the principal is informed (that happens with probability e), the agent
obtains his private benefit b only when interests are congruent. Conversely,
when the principal is not informed and the agent is, he can exert real au-
thority and choose his most preferred option. The probability (1 − eP )eA
measures the extent of the agent’s real authority.13
Agent’s formal authority
When the agent holds formal authority over an activity, the expected payoffs
are, respectively for the principal and the agent
ÛP (eˆP , eˆA, pi, α) = êAαpi + (1− êA)êPpi − k ê
2
P
2
(3)
the agent is informed with probability eˆA and implements the project pre-
ferred by the principal with probability α. With probability (1− êA)êP the
agent is not informed whereas the principal knows which the relevant projects
are and can choose her preferred one. Similarly, the agent’s payoff is
ÛA(eˆA, eˆP , b, α) = êAb+ (1− êA)êPαb− γêA (4)
when the agent is informed, he can pick his most preferred option. When
the agent is not able to collect any information about that activity, whereas
the principal knows this information, the agent’s preferred project is chosen
only if the principal’s interests are the same as his, with probability α.
3 Allocation of Control and Congruence of
Interests
In this Section, the optimal allocation of control power according to interest
congruence is analyzed. As mentioned above, several activities are performed
in the organization. Specifically, there is a continuum of activities, each
identified by its congruence parameter α, where α ∈ [0, 1] and is uniformly
distributed over that interval.
13The cost per unit of effort is the same, no matter the activity such effort has been
spent upon and who holds formal authority. This assumption is introduced to analyze the
organizational structure that obtains when the leading criterion that guides the allocation
of control is the congruence of interests and not differences in expertise and ability. For
an analysis of delegation when the principal’s costs change from one activity to another
see Aghion and Tirole (1995).
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In order to write payoffs in a compact fashion, we can divide activities
in two subsets according to the value of α that characterizes them. Call D
and ND respectively the subsets of delegated and non-delegated activities.
When activity j is delegated, then α ∈ D, when it is not delegated, then
α ∈ ND.
Given the structure of the payoffs described above, the principal chooses
e∗P and ê∗P in order to maximize14∫
α∈D
[
ePpi + (1− eP )eAαpi − ke
2
P
2
]
f (α) dα+ (5)
+
∫
α∈ND
[
êAαpi + (1− êA)êPpi − k ê
2
P
2
]
f (α) dα
whereas the agent chooses e∗A and ê∗A to maximize∫
α∈D
[ePαb+ (1− eP )eAb− γeA] dα+
∫
α∈ND
[êAb+ (1− êA)êPαb− γêA] dα
(6)
Both parties maximize their expected payoff from each activity in the
continuum set [0, 1] and the level of effort chosen differs according to the
distribution of control and the degree of interest congruence α.
Notice that, following Aghion and Tirole (1995), in expressions (5) and (6)
we are assuming cost separability, in the sense that effort spent on an activity
does not influence costs borne working on other activities. Thus activities are
neither complements nor substitutes. Each activity is completely different
and working on it does not provide any useful expertise for the others. This
assumption is made mainly to simplify the analysis, that otherwise would
become formally intractable, unless specific assumption on the shape of the
functionals expressing optimal efforts, e∗P and e∗A are made.
Cost separability has the nice feature that, since the problem has the same
structure for each α ∈ D and for each α ∈ ND, we can solve it pointwise,
for each α ∈ D and α ∈ ND.
Principal’s Formal Authority
Given α ∈ A, the problem for the principal is to maximize (1) with respect
to eP , while the agent chooses whether to exert high or low effort.
14The congruence parameter α is uniformly distributed on [0, 1] . Its density is f (α) = 1.
Indication of the density function will be omitted hereafter.
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From (1), the principal’s optimal monitoring effort for any level of eA is
e∗P =
(1− eAα)pi
k
(7)
Given that the agent’s payoff is linear in eA, he will exert high effort eA
as long as
eP ≤ b− γb = e
lim
P (8)
whenever the inequality in (8) is not satisfied, the agent exerts low effort
eA = eA.
Agent’s Formal Authority
When the agent has formal authority over a certain activity, the expected
payoffs are given by equation (3) and (4) respectively for the principal and
the agent.
The principal’s optimal monitoring for any level of eA is
ê∗P =
(1− êA)pi
k
(9)
Notice that the principal’s optimal effort with delegation does not depend
on α. This is because the principal can use her real authority, whose amount
is directly proportional to her effort, only when the agent is uninformed. In
that case, congruence of interests is irrelevant, as the principal can rely on
her effort only and, if informed, can choose as she prefers.
Again, the agent’s payoff is linear in effort, so that eˆA = eA if and only if
êP ≤ b− γαb = ê
lim
P (10)
Discussion of the results
Comparing equations (8) and (10) leads to some interesting conclusions. The
proofs for the Lemmas introduced below are immediate, recalling that α < 1.
Lemma 1. (Aghion and Tirole) The principal’s effort in equilibrium is higher
when she holds formal authority, ê∗P < e∗P .
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This result is a consequence of the basic trade off between control and
initiative. When the agent has formal authority over an activity, the principal
has less incentives to bear high costs to monitor that activity, since she has
less opportunities to use the information she might find.
Lemma 2. The maximum amount of monitoring an agent tolerates without
being demotivated and ceasing to exert effort is higher when the agent holds
formal authority, ê limP > e
lim
P .
This second result is quite intuitive. If the agent has formal authority,
he can pick his most preferred project whenever he is informed and the
principal cannot stop him, even if she is informed and knows that the selected
project is not her preferred one. Therefore, the agent knows that higher
principal’s effort in monitoring and hence a higher probability of acquiring
information is counterbalanced by her lower ability to impose her preferences.
The delegation of formal authority is a commitment device to increase the
agent’s initiative and it also allows a closer and more intense monitoring.15
4 The delegation region
The principal decides on the allocation of authority trying to keep control
upon as many activities as she can.16 In order to characterize the optimal
allocation of authority we need to prove the following result.
Proposition 1. There exist two values α and α for the congruence param-
eter α such that (a) if the principal wishes to induce eA = e¯A, a necessary
condition is to delegate those with α ∈ [α, α] . (b) The principal keeps con-
trol over activities in the intervals [0, α) and (α, 1] and, when α ∈ [0, α) ,
eA = eA.
Proof. See Appendix.
It is interesting to see that the activities delegated are not the most
congruent ones. Intuition would perhaps lead to conclude that the principal
should loose control when the conflict of interests is not too sharp. On the
other hand, the more congruent the activity, the lower the optimal level of
monitoring and the easier it is for the principal to induce a high level of
15This could be extremely important when the principal wants to assess the agent’s
ability, for instance in order to promote him.
16This strategy relies on the presumption that, other things being held constant, the
principal (weakly) prefers to keep formal authority rather that delegate it to subordinates.
It is possible to show that such presumption is always correct.
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effort. There is no reason to delegate formal authority over such activities,
given also that the cost of monitoring them is low.
It is also possible to show that this result is robust to changes in the
shape of the cost function. Appendix B below provides an example where
both parties have quadratic cost functions. We find that the principal retains
control on activities with α > α¯, where α¯ is the same value found in the case
of linear costs.
Hereafter, the set of delegated activities will be called “delegation region”.
Besides α and α¯, there is another important cutoff value for α,that char-
acterizes the allocation of control, cutoff that has never been shown before
in this kind of models. Define αˆ the value of the congruence parameter such
that the agent is indifferent between exerting a low effort and working hard
when he holds formal authority. In order to find αˆ, recall that the agent
prefers a high effort when the principal’s monitoring on a delegated activity
is low enough. This happens if ê∗P = ê limP and, from equations (9) and (10),
(1− e¯A)pi
k
=
b− γ
αb
(11)
Solving for α
αˆ =
b− γ
b
k
(1− e¯A)pi (12)
For α < αˆ, the principal’s monitoring (which, on delegated activities, is
constant and does not depend on α) is low and the agent puts eA = e¯A. If
α > αˆ, instead, the agent puts no effort (thus free-riding on the principal’s
information), no matter that he has formal authority. Intuitively, both con-
gruence and the principal’s effort are high enough to guarantee that she will
be informed and choose the right project. The agent has high probability to
obtain his private benefit b even with eA = eA. Then, if the principal exerts
enough effort, the agent free rides on her effort.
Given that the principal (weakly) prefers to keep control over an activity
where eA = eA, she does not delegate those with α > αˆ. Three cases have
then to be distinguished.
Case 1. αˆ > α¯. In this case, shown in Figure 2(a), the cutoff αˆ is not
relevant17 and the allocation of control is as described in Proposition
1.
Case 2. αˆ < α. In this second case, shown in Figure 2(b), the whole delega-
tion region disappears, as the agent exerts no effort in the range [α, α¯]
and there are no reasons to delegate him authority.
17The principal would delegate activities with α > αˆ anyway.
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Case 3. α < αˆ < α¯. The delegation region shrinks to [α, αˆ] , whereas the
principal retains control over activities with α ∈ [αˆ, α¯] , that, according
to Proposition 1, were previously delegated. This last case is shown in
Figure 2(c).
The following proposition describes the optimal allocation of control in
an organization.
Proposition 2. If αˆ > α, the Principal delegates control upon all activities
with α ∈ [α, αlim] , where αlim = min {αˆ, α¯} . If αˆ < α, the principal never
delegates control. Delegation would not induce the agent to work hard.
Two comparative-statics results then follow.
Corollary 1. When αlim = αˆ, the delegation region is smaller the higher pi,
the principal’s private benefit. When αlim = α¯, the delegation region shrinks
with pi iff pi > pi∗1, where pi∗1 = k
[
2(b−γ)
be¯A(2−e¯A)
] 1
2
, otherwise, it becomes larger as
pi increases.
Proof. See Appendix.
An implication of Corollary 1 is that, overall, the agent works less when
the principal’s private benefit pi is higher. A reduction in the delegation
region implies that the agent exerts low effort on a larger number of activities.
The principal prefers a less active worker when potential gains are high.18
Corollary 2. If pi is low enough, the delegation region increases as moni-
toring becomes easier for the principal (i.e. k decreases).
Proof. See Appendix.
Corollary 2 shows the principal’s attempt to solve the basic trade-off.
When monitoring is easier, the principal tends to increase effort, thus weak-
ening the agent’s incentives to work hard. To restore them, the principal
delegates more, if the expected loss implied by this policy is not too large.
Finally, a more able agent (characterized by a cost function with a lower
γ) obtains formal authority upon a smaller share of activities, as the following
Lemma states.
18If the principal’s benefit pi < pi∗, the delegation region increases with pi. This is because,
as pi becomes larger, the principal’s monitoring increases too (see equation (7)). It then
becomes harder to satisfy the limit imposed by expression (8). Given that the principal’s
effort in decreasing in α, the principal has to delegate activities with higher α in order
to induce a high effort in the agent. If her private benefit is not too high (pi < pi∗), the
principal relinquishes more control rights rather than giving up on agent’s effort.
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Lemma 3. When αlim = α¯,an increase in γ always enlarges the delegation
region. When αlim = αˆ, an increase in γ instead reduces delegation.
Proof. See Appendix.
This result is, again, intuitive. In this model, delegation occurs principally
to induce the agent to work hard. If delegation is always an effective incentive
device (which happens when αˆ > α¯ and αlim = α¯) and the agent has low costs,
it is easier to induce high effort and he tolerates high monitoring on a larger
share of activities. The delegation region can thus be reduced. If instead
the agent has a high propensity to free ride on the principal’s effort and
delegation is very likely to be ineffective (αˆ < α¯ and αlim = αˆ) an increase
in costs, worsening the free-rider problem, induces the principal to reduce
delegation.
The alternance of “intervals of congruence”, where authority is not dele-
gated, with intervals of delegation and the existence of activities where the
principal tolerates the agent to exert no effort suggest a few interesting con-
clusions, summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 3. The principal’s effort is non monotonic in α. It is highest
on the least congruent activities, lowest on the delegation region and decreases
with congruence on the most congruent activities. The agent’s effort too is
non monotonic in α. It is high on the delegation region and on the non-
delegated activities with highest α. It is low on the least congruent activities
and can alternate intervals of high and low effort if αˆ < α¯.
The principal’s and the agent’s efforts when αˆ > α¯ are depicted in Figures
3(a) and 3(b) respectively, whereas the case with α < αˆ < α¯ is depicted in
Figures 4(a) and 4(b).
5 Empirical implications
The previous Sections have enlightened some criteria that influence (or should
influence) the allocation of power in organizations. Lemma 2 predicts that
agents with formal authority tolerate a higher degree of monitoring. An
implication of this result is that more developed and efficient monitoring
systems should be accompanied by higher degrees of delegation. This result is
shown in Corollary 2, that states that, under given parameter constellations,
lower monitoring costs for the principal (lower k) determine an enlargement
of the delegation region.
A similar result can be found also in Burkart, Gromb and Panunzi (1997),
who show that lower monitoring costs (hence more intense monitoring) lead
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to less concentrated ownership structures (that facilitate the manager’s ini-
tiative). These results can be supported empirically by proving that owner-
ship is more dispersed and the extent of delegation larger in environments
that facilitate monitoring. There seems to be a strong relationship between
the development of legal systems19 and ownership dispersion as Shleifer and
Vishny (1997) show. More specifically, the result presented in Lemma 2
would be better supported by evidence about the relationship between mon-
itoring technologies and the company’s internal organization, especially the
degree of decentralization and delegation. However, the studies cited above
support the intuition that inside organizations there might be a concern not
to reduce the manager’s initiative.
The main result is Proposition 1, that states that the principal optimally
delegates activities with “intermediate congruence”, neither too low nor too
high. Besides its intuitive implications, thoroughly presented above, this
result seems difficult to test empirically. First of all, an objective measure
of interest congruence should be defined, which looks like a hard task.20 It
would also be necessary to define what it is meant by “intermediate” level of
congruence.
Typically, higher layers in hierarchies tend to favor some employees, often
independently of their abilities. The subjective criterion superiors use to
evaluate employees may well be interest congruence. The tendency towards
the creation of “yes men”21 seems to suggest that the favored employees
present a high congruence of interests, as these employees are prone to follow
the superior’s preferences. This would not be enough, however, to reject
the result in Proposition 1. Such evidence may be contaminated by various
factors, overlooked intentionally in this analysis. Private benefits from an
activity may be a decreasing function of interest congruence22 which is likely
to shift preferences towards delegating most congruent activities. There may
also be an upper constraint to the time and resources both the employee
and her superior can dedicate to work. In that case, it can then happen
that the most congruent activities are optimally delegated. An employee
dedicates more time to delegated activities, where his real authority is then
higher. If the principal cannot monitor as much as she liked because of time
19Especially the system’s effectiveness in protecting minority investors and their ability
to be informed about the company’s performance).
20A possibility would be to interview a number of entrepreneurs and build an index
based on their answers. This device, far from providing an objective evaluation, would
also be affected by the same fragility of empirical results obtained by means of qualitative
indices.
21See Prendergast and Stole (1996).
22Formally, pi = pi(α), pi
′
< 0.
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constraints, she would rather delegate most congruent activities, to better
control relatively less congruent activities.
6 The Dynamics of the Delegation of Power
In this Section we want to extend the analysis to consider a multiperiod set-
ting. We want to investigate whether and how it is optimal for the principal
to change the allocation of authority over time and the extent of delegation.
6.1 A necessary condition
The agent has to screen the same set of activities indexed by the congruence
parameter α ∈ [0, 1] for T periods.23 It is assumed that the agent learns over
time how to perform better in his job. His learning is directly proportional
to the total effort (current and past) exerted on each activity. To capture the
idea of learning as an increase in the agent’s skills and ability, it is assumed
here that current effort spent on an activity reduces future marginal costs on
that particular activity. Therefore effort becomes a sort of specific investment
in skills, which has important incentive effects. This can be represented by
means of the following cost function
gAt(eA1,eA2,..., eAt) = γeAt − l
t−1∑
i=1
eAi (13)
where γ and l are scalars, γ, l > 0. The parameter γ represents the (constant)
marginal cost in the initial period t = 1. Given that the cost function (13)
is linear, the agent’s payoff too is linear in effort.24 According to (13), the
effort spent working on an activity decreases the agent’s marginal (and total)
cost in all future periods by l per effort unit. Thus, l represents the rate (or
speed) of learning.
As in Section 3, the total payoffs from the activities upon which the
principal holds formal authority are, respectively for the principal and the
23T could be for example the duration of the life cycle of a given product and the agent
has to choose the best marketing strategy for it. Alternatively, T could be the working
life of the agent himself.
24The analytical form for the cost function has been chosen following the traditional
literature on learning by doing. According to that literature, learning causes a drop in
production costs and the “cost function with learning” is usually decreasing with respect
to cumulative production, so that learning is considered a type of economy of scale.
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agent
UP =
T∑
t=1
δt−1P
{∫
α∈ND
[
ePtpi + (1− ePt)eAtαpi − ke
2
Pt
2
]
dα
}
(14)
and
UA =
T∑
t=1
δt−1A
{∫
α∈ND
[
ePtαb+ (1− ePt)eAtb−
(
γeAi − l
t−1∑
i=1
eAi
)]
dα
}
(15)
where δx, x ∈ {P,A} ,is the intertemporal discount factor for the principal
and for the agent, 0 < δx < 1.
Conversely, the total payoffs for the activities delegated to the agent are,
respectively for the principal and the agent
ÛP =
T∑
t=1
δt−1P
{∫
α∈D
[
êAtαpi + (1− êAt)êPtpi − kê
2
Pt
2
]
dα
}
(16)
and
ÛA =
T∑
t=1
δt−1A
{∫
α∈D
[
êAtb+ (1− êAt)êPtαb−
(
γeˆAt − l
t−1∑
i=1
êAi
)]
dα
}
(17)
In order to guarantee that the cost of effort is always non-negative, we
assume that the following condition is always satisfied
γeAt − l
t−1∑
j=1
eAj ≥ 0 (18)
∀t, where t = 1, 2, ....., T. We thus have T different conditions, one for each
period t. Given that learning is directly proportional to the number of periods
in which the agent performs a certain task, the T conditions above can be
replaced by the following inequality
γeAT − l
T−1∑
j=1
eAj ≥ 0 (19)
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Given that the agent’s cost function is linear in effort, he will always
attain a corner solution, either exerting maximum effort e¯A or no effort at
all. If we consider that the agent can choose between two levels of effort only,
eA and e¯A, condition (19) becomes
γeA − l(T − 1)e¯A ≥ 0 (20)
that is, costs are still positive if the agent has exerted high effort in all
previous periods but low effort in T.
We now investigate under which conditions the agent exerts positive
(maximum) effort e¯A.To solve this problem we proceed by backward induc-
tion.
For a given level of the agent’s effort, the principal strictly prefers to keep
formal authority upon an activity. In period T, the agent produces high effort
(eAT = eA) in a non delegated activity if and only if the principal’s monitoring
level satisfies the following condition, which is obtained as condition (8) in
Section 3
ePT ≤ elimPT = b− γb (21)
It is immediate to check that the maximum amount of monitoring the agent
tolerates in the last period is exactly the same as in the static model presented
above. This happens because at time T there will be no future benefits from
exerting effort on an activity and we are therefore in a situation similar to a
static game. Following the same procedure introduced in Proposition 1, it is
possible to find α¯T , the highest value of α that represents the upper limit to
the delegation region at time T, that is, for any α > α¯T the principal retains
control. Given that αT = α¯ and α is invariant with respect to time and it
is equal to the one found in the stating setting,25 the delegation region in
period T does not change when learning by doing is introduced.
We now proceed to calculate the maximum amount of monitoring and
the limits to the delegation region for any period t < T. For all t < T the
problem presents the same structure. In a generic period t, if the principal
holds formal authority, the agent will exert effort eAt = eA if and only if the
principal’s monitoring effort is lower than a certain threshold. The condition
25This can be checked directly from expression (31) in the proof to Lemma 3. The
intuition for this result can be found considering that the principal’s choice of whether to
delegate and obtain high effort or not delegate and obtain low effort does not depend on
the agent’s costs. Therefore, the agent’s decisions on how much effort to spend hence how
much knowledge to acquire has no effect on the choice of α.
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on eP is obtained comparing the agent’s choice between high and low effort
in a certain period, given that in all following periods he will put high effort
and has put high effort in all previous ones.
At period t the agent faces the choice between exerting high or low effort,
given the effort he spent in the past (that now represents his amount of
knowledge) and the incentives he will face in future periods. Here we assume
that in future periods incentives will be such that the agent will always put
high effort but any alternative assumption would lead to the same results
as the terms relative to future periods in the left and the right hand side
cancel out. In fact, the effort exerted in a certain period t does not influence
the choice of effort in subsequent periods, effort that depends solely on the
amount of monitoring the agent is subjected to in each period.26 The agent
chooses to exert high effort in t if and only if
ePt ≤ elimPt = b− γb + δA
l
b
1− δT−t−1A
1− δA (22)
Equation (22) implies that the principal can optimally keep control over
that activity while getting a high degree of effort from the subordinate if and
only if α ≥ αt, where αt is obtained as in Propositions 1 and is equal to
αt =
1
eA
−
k
[
b− γ + δAl 1−δT−t−1A1−δA
]
pibeA
(23)
It is now possible to state the following result.
Lemma 4. The agent tolerates a decreasing level of monitoring (elimPt−1 >
elimPt ) and the delegation region increases over time (αt−1 < αt), reaching its
maximum extension at t = T.
Proof. Comparing the expressions for elimPt−1 and elimPt−1 obtained from (26)
and for α¯t−1, α¯t and α¯T from (23) and (32), it can be readily checked that
ePt−1 > ePt and α¯t < α¯t−1 if and only if δA < 1. Then elimPT−1 > elimPT as
δA lb
1−δT−t−1A
1−δA > 0 and for the same reason α¯T < α¯T−1.
This last result has important implications. First of all, it states that the
agent requires stronger incentives over time: notwithstanding the reduction
26The agent’s choice of whether to put high or low effort in a certain period does not
depend either on past or on future decisions and it is only a function of the intensity of
monitoring, ePt.
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in costs, he demands more delegation. The learning effect implies a realloca-
tion of control rights from the principal to the agent period after period, in
the sense that the delegation region becomes larger and larger as the agent
learns. This is because the longer the time horizon faced by the agent (the
lower t), the higher the number of periods in which the effort exerted in t is
going to reduce costs. Therefore, the agent needs weaker incentives to work
hard, as the effort exerted today not only increases his real authority in the
current period but also in all following periods. This explains why, in the
last period T, only the effect on marginal costs matters. Effort exerted in T
influences only real authority in that period and has not future effects.
As time elapses, the period over which the agent can benefit from his
investment in learning becomes shorter and he requires stronger incentives
to work hard. To this purpose, the principal recurs to promotions and gives
him formal authority over a larger number of activities. The result that an
individual needs stronger incentives the closer to the end her working life, has
been obtained also by Gibbons and Murphy (1992) although for completely
different reasons. In their model, the principal has imperfect information
about the agent’s ability. In the early stages of his working life, the agent
has the incentive to work harder in order to signal his ability and obtain
better contractual terms in future periods. As the estimate of his ability
becomes more and more precise in time, his career concerns lose strength
and he needs more intense explicit incentives to work.
In our model, the agent’s ability is known from start to both parties and
the perspective of acquiring precious experience, useful for many periods to
come, is the main reason for lighter incentives at the beginning. However,
the problem of the agent free riding on the principal’s effort exists also in a
dynamic setting, as the following subSection will show.
6.2 The dynamic adjustment
We are now going to analyze for which values of α the agent exerts high
effort e¯A when he has formal authority. We are therefore looking for a cutoff
equivalent to the value αˆ found in the static model and we want to see how
such cutoff changes over time with the agent’s learning. Again, to solve this
problem, we proceed by backward induction.
In the final period T there are no benefits from learning, as the game will
not be repeated. From Section 3 we know that the agent exerts high effort
e¯A upon a delegated activity if both the principal’s effort eP and congruence
α are low enough not to provide sufficient guarantee that he will obtain his
private benefit b in any case. Since the game at T is analogous to a one-shot
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game, eˆAT = e¯A if and only if
eˆPT ≤ eˆlimP = b− γαb (24)
and this implies that eˆAT = e¯A for any α ≤ αˆT , where αˆT is obtained exactly
as in Section 4 and is equal to
αˆT =
b− γ
b
k
(1− e¯A)pi (25)
For any generic t < T, the agent puts high effort on a delegated activity
if and only if
eˆPt ≤ eˆlimPt = b− γαb + δA
l
αb
1− δT−t−1A
1− δA (26)
At the optimum, the principal puts effort eˆPt = 1−e¯Ak pi, invariant with
respect to α. Equating (26) to eˆPt and solving out for α yields the highest
value of α that satisfies (26), αˆt. For any α > αˆt the agent free rides on
the principal’s effort and delegation is ineffective an incentive to exert effort.
The value αˆt is
αˆt =
k
(1− e¯A)pi
[
b− γ
b
+ δA
l
b
1− δT−t−1A
1− δA
]
(27)
Lemma 5. The principal’s effort level sufficient to provoke free riding de-
creases over time (eˆlimPt−1 > eˆlimPt ) whereas the set of activities where the agent
free rides increases over time (αˆt < αˆt−1) and reaches a maximum at T.
Proof. Comparing the expressions for eˆlimPt−1 and eˆlimPt−1 obtained from (26)
and for αˆt−1, αˆt and αˆT from (27) and (25), it can be readily checked that
eˆPt−1 > eˆPt and αˆt < αˆt−1 if and only if δA < 1. Moreover eˆlimPT−1 > eˆlimPT as
δA lb
1−δT−t−1A
1−δA > 0 and for the same reason αˆT < αˆT−1.
This result is in line with that in Lemma 5. As time elapses, the agent’s
specific investment becomes less and less valuable, because of the shorter
and shorter time horizon. Hence he requires stronger incentives over time
to put effort, even on delegated activities. This last finding adds to the
characterization of the dynamics of control, dynamics that can now be fully
described. Noticing that the value α is invariant with respect to time, we can
distinguish among three different cases, each one presenting some subcases.
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Case 1 αˆT > α¯T . This case is equivalent to Case 1 in Section 4. Here
the cutoff αˆt is in the set of activities the principal never delegates
at each t and is therefore irrelevant. The dynamics of delegation is
that described in Lemma 5, with the delegation region (and thus the
strength of incentives) getting larger over time. This case is depicted
in Figure 5(a).
Case 2 αˆT <α. This case is equivalent to Case 2 in Section 4 and three
different subcases can be distinguished.
Case 2.a αˆT < αˆ1 <α. Here delegation never occurs. The agent exerts
minimum effort eA on all activities with α < α¯t and the principal
cannot induce more effort by delegation. The set of activities over
which the agent puts eA = e¯A becomes smaller over time. This case is
described in Figure 5(b).
Case 2.b αˆT < α < α¯1 < αˆ1. Here α¯1, the lower limit to the delegation
region at t = 1 and αˆ1, the cutoff value above which free riding occurs
on delegated activities, move in opposite directions. Initially, α¯1 < αˆ1
and αˆ1 is irrelevant: the delegation region increases as in Case 1. At
some time t∗ we have that αˆt∗ ≤ α¯t∗ and the agent starts to free ride
on the principal’s effort. His career concerns become too weak. If
the principal based her incentive schemes only on delegation, then the
span of delegation should decrease initially and then delegation should
be abandoned altogether, when αˆt < α. This is depicted in Figure 5(c).
Case 2.c αˆT < α < αˆ1 < α¯1. In this case there is some delegation in earlier
periods (the region [α, αˆt] as long as α < αˆ1). However, the delegation
region shrinks over time and disappears at some t∗ such that αˆt∗ < α.
Figure 5(d) illustrates this case.
Case 3 α< αˆT < α¯T . The optimal dynamics of control in this case depends
on the relative locations of α¯1 and αˆ1. If α¯1 < αˆ1 we are in Case 2.b
and the delegation region shrinks over time. If α¯1 > αˆ1 we are in Case
2.c and delegation never occurs.
7 Concluding Remarks
In this paper we have shown that the optimal allocation of control in an orga-
nization sees the principal keeping control over the least congruent activities
(as we would expect) but also on the most congruent. Control is relinquished
only on activities with an “intermediate” degree of congruence of interests.
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Moreover, delegation can be an effective way of motivating subordinates as
long as the parties’ interests are not too close. If this were the case, in fact,
subordinates may try to free ride on the superior’s effort even when they
hold control powers.
Extending the model to an intertemporal setting, we reach a result sim-
ilar to the ones typical of the literature on career concerns, where stronger
incentives are needed over time. Here, we prove the need to increase the
extent of the agent’s authority and control over time and we provide a new
rationale for internal careers and promotions.
In an attempt to test the relevance of career concerns, empirical studies
have found little evidence of a link between managerial compensation and
their performance. Jensen and Murphy (1990), for example, have shown
that the sensitivity of CEO compensation to firm’s value as a proxy for
management productivity is very low.
We claim here that, more than career concerns, what drives the demand
for stronger incentives is that, as the agent’s working life carries on, on the
one hand he acquires knowledge and on-the-job experience, which decreases
his cost of effort.27 On the other hand, he is less and less interested in
acquiring new knowledge that he would be able to exploit for a relatively
short amount of time. High effort is thus obtained only at the expenses of
more control.
In this sense, there is enough evidence of a positive correlation between
compensation, power and experience, correlation our model is able to cap-
ture.
In our model, the demand for higher incentives is offset by an increas-
ing tendency to free ride as time elapses. If this tendency is strong enough,
delegation may prove useless as an incentive device. The role played by this
free-riding effect in our model is even more important as we have intention-
ally ruled out reputation concerns, that would prevent an agent to shirk.
However, also reputation concerns28 are likely to become weaker as a worker
approaches the end of her career at which point her ability and skill should
be generally known.
The problem of free riding in information collection has been studied also
27This decrease in effort costs can also be interpreted as an increase in the agent’s market
value due to the fact that his superior knowledge and experience make him attractive to
other companies too.
28Reputation concerns are believed to be the main reason of the low correlation between
pay and performance. A manager with reputation concerns is unwilling to undertake risky
investments for fear of revealing scarce ability and in order to induce him to take risks,
high pay may be required (see Holmstro¨m and Ricart I Costa, 1996 and Caruana and
Celentani, 1999).
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by other contributions, mainly in the field of law and economics and jury
decision making (e.g. see Davis, 1994 and Fedderson and Pesendorfer,1998)
and the common feature in most of these contributions seems to be the public
nature of information and the fact that the outcome obtained by using that
information affects all parties equally. Information can be neither withheld
nor misrepresented.
In our model, information assumes a strategic role not only because it
is costly to acquire it but also because it can be used to favor one of the
parties, possibly at the detriment of the others. There is a trade off between
free riding and strategic manipulation of information. The more congruent
the parties’ interests the lower the strategic value of information and thus
the more serious the free riding problem.
This stresses the importance of our result, that only activities with inter-
mediate congruence ought to be delegated. On highly congruent activities,
an agent is very likely to free ride.
A Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1
Step 1 The principal retains control over all activities with α > α.
If the inequality in (8) holds, the principal optimally monitors according
to (7) and the agent puts high effort eA = eA.When e∗P > e
lim
P , the inequality
in (8) is violated and the agent puts low effort. If the principal wants high
effort from the agent, the maximum monitoring she can exert is eP = e limP .
Otherwise, she can delegate to induce the high effort.
Since e∗P is decreasing in α and can take any value in the interval [0, eP ] ,
there must exists an α s.t. e∗P = e
lim
P . Equating expressions (7) and (8) and
solving for α yields
α =
1
eA
− k (b− γ)
pibeA
(28)
Since e∗P is decreasing in α, e∗P < e limP for α > α, the constraint in (8) is
satisfied, the principal is maximizing her expected payoff and the agent puts
high effort. There is no reason for the principal to delegate control.
If α < α, e∗P > e
lim
P and eA = 0.
The existence of α is guaranteed by the conditions presented in the fol-
lowing Lemma.
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Lemma 6. (Existence and uniqueness of α). A relevant value α exists (i.e.
0 < α < 1) iff pi |α=0< pi < pi |α=1, where pi |α=0= k(b−γ)b , pi |α=1= k(b−γ)b(1−e¯A) and
pi |α=0< pi |α=1 .
Proof. The two thresholds pi |α=0and pi |α=1can be found immediately, re-
spectively posing α = 0 and α = 1 and solving for pi. Comparing the two
values found as described shows that pi |α=0< pi |α=1 .
The intuition for the result just stated is as follows. If the principal’s
benefit pi is very large (pi > pi |α=1) then, ∀α, e∗P > elimP and eA = 0. In
equilibrium the principal wants to monitor very closely and this curbs the
agent’s initiative. If pi is very low (pi < pi |α=0) then ∀α, e∗P < elimP and
eA = e¯A. In equilibrium the principal does not monitor much and the agent
has incentives to put high effort.
Assuming that a relevant value α exists, for α < α the principal has two
options.
a) Delegate activities with α < α.
b) Hold formal authority on activities with α < α, exert eP = e∗P as given
by (7) and have eA = 0.
Step 2 The principal delegates all activities with α ∈ [α, α¯] , inducing the
high effort e¯A and holds formal authority, inducing the low effort 0, on
activities with α < α.
The principal’s payoff in case a) can be computed substituting her effort
given by expression (9) into her payoff function (3), given eA = eA
ÛP (ê∗P , eA, pi, α) = eAαpi +
(1− eA)2pi2
2k
(29)
whereas her payoff in case b) is obtained substituting effort as given by (8)
UP (e∗P , 0, pi, α) =
pi2
2k
(30)
Comparing the principal’s payoffs in cases a) and b), it can be shown
that ÛP (ê∗P , eA, pi, α) > UP (e∗P , 0, pi, α) if and only if α > α, where
α =
pi
2k
(2− e¯A) (31)
The existence of α is guaranteed by the conditions presented in the fol-
lowing Lemma.
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Lemma 7. (Existence of α). A relevant value α exists (0 < α < α) iff
pi1<pi < pi2, where pi1 = −pi2 = 2bk+k[b
2−2b(2−e¯A)e¯A(b−γ)]
1
2
b(2−e¯A)e¯A . The value α is
always positive.
Proof. Pose α = α and solve for pi. Equation α = α is of second degree
in pi. Two solutions are then found, pi1,2 =
2bk±k[b2−2b(2−e¯A)e¯A(b−γ)]
1
2
b(2−e¯A)e¯A . It can
be checked that, in the admissible range for the parameters and given the
existence of real roots,29 both pi1 and pi2 are positive and that α − α < 0 iff
pi1 < pi < pi2. From (31) it can be immediately seen that α > 0.
These results are quite intuitive. If α < 0, the principal would relinquish
control of activity whose congruence is very small. This is not desirable. The
principal prefers to keep control over all activities with α < α, even if eA = 0,
if her private benefit pi is very large (pi > pi2). In that case, α > α. The same
happens if pi < pi1. This second case would seem rather counterintuitive: the
principal’s benefit is very small and she does not delegate. This happens
because, with such a small pi, her optimal monitoring effort is very low and
her real authority too little to delegate.
Proof of Corollary 1
αlim = αˆ It is immediate to show that the threshold α increases with pi.
Moreover, ∂αˆ∂pi < 0. The delegation region [α, αˆ] becomes smaller as pi
increases.
αlim = α¯ ∂α¯∂pi > 0, then the limits of the delegation region [α, α¯] change in
the same direction. If
∣∣∣∂α∂pi ∣∣∣ > ∣∣∂α¯∂pi ∣∣ , the delegation region moves toward
more congruent activities and shrinks as pi increases. It can be checked
that
∣∣∣∂α∂pi ∣∣∣ > ∣∣∂α¯∂pi ∣∣ iff pi > pi∗1 = k [ 2(b−γ)be¯A(2−e¯A)] 12 .
Proof of Corollary 2
First of all, check that α increases as k decreases (i.e. ∂α∂k < 0). When
monitoring is less costly, the principal prefers to keep control over a larger
portion of low-congruence activities.
αlim = α¯ Check that α¯ increases as k decreases (∂α¯∂k < 0). Then, then the
limits of the delegation region [α, α¯] change in the same direction. If
29The equation α− α = 0 has real roots iff (1− 4e¯A + 2e¯2A)b+ 2e¯Aγ(2− e¯A) > 0.
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∣∣∣∂α∂k ∣∣∣ < ∣∣∂α¯∂k ∣∣ , the delegation region moves toward more congruent ac-
tivities and becomes larger as k increases. The inequality
∣∣∣∂α∂k ∣∣∣ < ∣∣∂α¯∂k ∣∣
holds iff pi < pi∗1 = k
[
2(b−γ)
be¯A(2−e¯A)
] 1
2
, where pi∗1 is the same value found in
Corollary 1.
αlim = αˆ The cutoff αˆ is decreasing in k. Then, then the limits of the del-
egation region [α, αˆ] change in the same direction. If
∣∣∣∂α∂k ∣∣∣ < ∣∣∂αˆ∂k ∣∣ ,
the delegation region moves toward more congruent activities and be-
comes larger as k increases. The inequality
∣∣∣∂α∂k ∣∣∣ < ∣∣∂α¯∂k ∣∣ holds iff
pi < pi∗2 = k
[
2k
(2−e¯A)(1−e¯A)b
] 1
2
.
Proof of Lemma 3
It can be readily checked from (31) that the threshold α is invariant with
respect to γ. From (28), the cutoff α¯ is always increasing in γ. From (12), αˆ
is always decreasing in γ.
Proof of Lemma 4
From the principal’s payoff function (14) it can be checked that, if eAT = e¯A,
then e∗PT =
(1−αe¯A)pi
k . When the inequality in (21) is satisfied and e
∗
PT ≤ elimPT ,
then e∗AT = e¯A. There exist a value for α such that e∗PT = elimPT . From the
expression for e∗PT and (21) this cutoff is
αT =
1
eA
− k(b−
γ
T )
pibeA
(32)
and comparing expression (32) with (28) obtained in Proposition 1 it can be
seen that αT < α.
When α > αT , then e∗PT < elimPT and e∗AT = e¯A. When α < αT , then
e∗PT > elimPT and e∗AT = 0. If the principal wants to obtain high effort from the
agent, she has to delegate.
From Proposition 1, there exist a cutoff α such that the principal prefers
to keep formal authority upon activities with α < α, even if this implies
e∗AT = 0. Given that the cutoff obtained in Proposition 1 does not depend on
the agent’s cost (see equation (31)), α is the same in all periods and is not
influenced by the agent’s learning process.
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B Delegation with quadratic agent’s costs
In this Appendix, we want to show that the result obtained in Section 4, that
optimal delegation concerns activities with intermediate degree of congruence
of interests, does not depend on the linear form chosen for the agent’s cost
function. In order to do this, we assume that the agent’s costs are expressed
by a quadratic cost function, equivalent to the principal’s one, of the kind
gA(eA) = γ
e2A
2
(33)
For a given activity with congruence α, the agent’s payoff function when
then principal has formal authority and when authority is delegated to the
agent are, respectively
ePαb+ (1− eP )eAb− γ e
2
A
2
(34)
and
êAb+ (1− êA)êPαb− γ ê
2
A
2
(35)
The first order conditions are, respectively
eA = b
1− eP
γ
(36)
and
eˆA = b
1− αeˆP
γ
(37)
Given the principal’s first order conditions expressed in the main text by
in (7) and (9), the equilibrium levels of effort are
e∗A =
b(k − pi)
kγ − αbpi , e
∗
P =
pi(γ − αb)
kγ − αbpi (38)
and
eˆ∗A =
b(k − αpi)
kγ − αbpi , eˆ
∗
P =
pi(γ − b)
kγ − αbpi (39)
From (38) it can be checked that e∗A ≤ e¯A < 1 if and only if α ≤ α¯, where
α¯ =
1
e¯A
− k (b− γ)
e¯Apib
which is exactly the same value found in Proposition 1 with a linear cost
function. If α > α¯, then e∗A = e¯A and there is no need to delegate.
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